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 “Chinese Boxes: ‘Typhoon’ and Conrad’s History of the Chinese” 
 




Much recent criticism of Joseph Conrad’s “Typhoon” has been particularly interested in 
reading it as an enquiry into kinds and theories of language and representation.1 In 
particular, attention has been paid to metaphoricity, to Captain MacWhirr’s professed 
allegiance to facts, and his hostility to fiction and figuration, within a narrative which is 
itself both fictional and figural.2  This essay proposes rather to examine “Typhoon” as 
Conrad himself described it, as a story about “a lot of Chinamen coolies and a few 
seamen on board a steamer in a gale of wind”.3 Each Chinese coolie has a box, and at the 
height of the storm there is a fight over the boxes’ contents. The ship itself is a Chinese 
box, a Chinese-named cargo vessel transporting Chinese labourers. And I will argue here 
that the tale itself can be approached as a nest of Chinese boxes containing, among much 
else, several versions of a history of the Chinese.4  
 
First compartment: anarchy in the hold 
 
Conrad, who knew more about most things than most people, is not famous for 
his knowledge of China, though there are Chinese people in a number of his stories, 
usually in the background.5 On board the Nan-Shan, in “Typhoon”, the Chinese are 
actually in the majority. “The Nan-Shan was on her way from the southward to the treaty 
port of Fu-chau, with some cargo in her lower holds, and two hundred Chinese coolies 
                                                 
1
 The author is grateful for support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council in the preparation of this 
essay. 
2
 See for example the following – Joseph Kolupke, “Elephants, Empires, and Blind Men: A Reading of the 
Figurative Language in Conrad’s ‘Typhoon’”, Conradiana 20:1 (Spring 1988), 71-85; Eberhard Griem, 
“Rhetoric and Reality in Conrad’s ‘Typhoon’”, Conradiana 24:1 (Spring 1992), 21-32; Amar Acheraïou, 
“Floating Words: Sea as Metaphor of Style in ‘Typhoon’”, Conradian 29:1 (Spring 2004), 27-38. Ian Watt 
persuasively reads the tale as a comedy centred on the contrast between the literal-minded and under-
imaginative MacWhirr and the inexperienced and over-imaginative Jukes. Ian Watt, “Comedy and Humour 
in ‘Typhoon’”, Essays on Conrad (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000), 97-111. I have also 
learned from the following essays: Sooyoung Chon, “‘Typhoon’: Silver Dollars and Stars”, Conradiana 
22:1 (1990), 25-43; Byron Caminero-Santangelo, “Testing for Truth: Joseph Conrad and the Ideology of 
the Examination”, Clio 23:3 (1994), 271-284; James Hansford, “Money, Language and the Body in 
‘Typhoon’”, Conradiana 26:2/3 (1994), 135-55. 
3
 The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad: volume 2 1898-1902, ed. Frederick R. Karl and Laurence Davies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 295. (Letter of 8th October 1900 to J. B. Pinker.) 
4
 “Chinese boxes” are understood to be nested, and the English phrase is often a figure for layers of secrecy 
and gradual disclosure. In traditional Chinese design, small compartments to house objects are known as 
duo bao ge, “spaces for many treasures”. These are something like cabinet curios and some designs contain 
boxes within boxes. Such objects date back at least to the Ming dynasty, but were very popular in the Qing, 
especially at court. The Qianlong emperor had a famous collection. (I am very grateful to Dr Koon Yeewan 
for information about Chinese boxes.) 
5
 See Heliéna M. Krenn, “China and the Chinese in the Works of Joseph Conrad,” Conradiana 27:2 
(Summer 1995), 83-96. 
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returning to their village homes in the province of Fo-kien, after a few years of work in 
various tropical colonies” (6).6 Their first mention – “some cargo… and two hundred 
Chinese coolies” – tells us that they are not the same thing as cargo, but it is not clear just 
what they are and how they should be named and represented.7 The mate Jukes refers to 
them as passengers, but this earns a rebuke from his captain, since passengers are people 
who have paid for their passage – “Never heard a lot of coolies spoken of as passengers 
before. Passengers indeed!” (31) – and Jukes later calls them “a cargo of Chinamen” (99). 
But evidently they occupy some intermediate category in the great chain of being 
between inanimate cargo and human passengers (and they are certainly not sailors).8  
 
Once the typhoon has seized on the ship, the fore ’tween-deck containing the 
Chinese re-presents the human-inhuman enigma in aural form, for the storm seems to 
have got inside it. “Its howls and shrieks seemed [to the boatswain] to take on, in the 
emptiness of the bunker, something of the human character, of human rage and pain – 
being not vast but infinitely poignant. And there were, with every roll, thumps too – 
profound, ponderous thumps, as if a bulky object of five-ton weight or so had got play in 
the hold. But there was no such thing in the cargo” (56). This unearthly noise is the sound 
of the Chinese. When finally we are given a sight of the ’tween-deck  – when, so to say, 
the first Chinese box is opened – what we see is one of the most arresting images in all 
Conrad’s fiction. 
It was stayed like the gallery of a mine, with a row of stanchions in the middle, 
and cross-beams overhead, penetrating the gloom ahead – indefinitely. And to 
port there loomed, like the caving in of one of the sides, a bulky mass with a 
slanting outline. The whole place, with the shadows and the shapes, moved all the 
time. The boatswain glared: the ship lurched to starboard, and a great howl came 
from that mass that had the slant of fallen earth…. With a precipitated sound of 
trampling and shuffling of bare feet, and with guttural cries, the mound of 
writhing bodies piled up to port detached itself from the ship’s side and shifted to 
starboard, sliding, inert and struggling, to a dull, brutal thump. The cries ceased. 
The boatswain heard a long moan through the roar and whistling of the wind; he 
saw an inextricable confusion of heads and shoulders, naked soles kicking 
upwards, fists raised, tumbling backs, legs, pigtails, faces (57-58). 
 
The boatswain struggles back on deck to report this sight to the captain, and to 
explain it. “Dollars! Dollars, sir. All their rotten chests got burst open. Blamed money 
skipping all over the place, and they are tumbling after it head over heels – tearing and 
biting like anything. A regular little hell in there” (62). The boatswain here seems to 
                                                 
6
 Joseph Conrad, Typhoon and Other Stories, Dent’s Collected Edition of the Works of Joseph Conrad, 22 
vols. (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1946-55), 6. Hereafter cited parenthetically with a page number. 
7
 The challenge that Chinese things present to Western taxonomies is discussed in Zhang Longxi, “The 
Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West”, Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn 1988), 108-131. Zhang’s 
starting point is Foucault’s discussion of Borges’s imaginary Chinese encyclopaedia. Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith  (New York: Vintage, 
1973), xv-xix. 
8
 For the uncertainty as to whether the coolies are passengers or cargo, see Ross G. Forman, “Coolie 
Cargoes: Emigrant Ships and the Burden of Representation in Joseph Conrad’s Typhoon and James 
Dalziel’s ‘Dead Reckoning’”, English Literature in Transition 47:4 (2004), 398-427; 411. 
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claim kin with Dante, reporting on his own underworld; but let us not be distracted by 
this.9 The hell in which the coolies find themselves is not a vision of the afterlife, but an 
actual place with social and political co-ordinates.  
 
Certainly the boatswain’s vision contains several parameters of the familiar 
hostile stereotype – the Chinese as a beastly, yet comical, money-grubbing mob. But it is 
possible to open up the teleological warrant that the stereotype contains. The Chinese 
coolies are literally lumped together to present a picture of a human aggregate of the most 
basic kind. Each individual is locked in struggle with all of the others, trying to secure his 
share of the resources in the form of the loose dollar coins clattering about the pitching 
floor of the ’tween-deck. Since all the chests, containing their belongings and savings, 
have burst open, no one can have any idea whether the dollars he is scrabbling for are 
rightfully his or someone else’s, so the situation is one of a very pure anarchy. The 
absence of authority and law – of what Enlightenment discourse calls the “civil state” – is 
similar to war, as Thomas Hobbes explained in Leviathan. “Whatsoever therefore is 
consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is 
consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own 
strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal.”10 This is the state of nature, 
and Hobbes goes on famously to describe human life in this natural state as “solitary, 
nasty, brutish, and short”. “To this war of every man against every man, this also is 
consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where 
no law, no injustice.”11 
 
This is where we start from; and human history as Hobbes understood it involves 
moving beyond – but without forgetting – this “natural condition of mankind”, through 
the development of institutions whereby people contract to give up some of their natural 
rights in exchange for peace or a modicum of security. Hobbes’s idea of a primitive 
natural brutishness was influenced in its turn by the classical discourse of barbarism, as 
codified by Aristotle, which held that non-Greeks, notably Asians, were less than human 
entities. This is a long story indeed, but for the purpose of this argument the important 
point is that in this Enlightenment discourse the state of nature is prehistoric. Hobbes 
actually gives a list of all the things that cannot exist in the state of war of everyone 
against everyone that is the state of nature: there can be no industry (in the sense of 
systematic and productive labour), no agriculture, navigation, architecture, engineering; 
no geographical knowledge, no account of time, no arts or letters, no society. This gives 
full force to the word “brutish” in Hobbes’s formula (“solitary, nasty, brutish, and 
short”): the state of nature is shared, of course, with the animals, creatures with no 
account of time, and no history. Every element of Conrad’s description of the coolies 
thrashing around in the gloom – the gloom itself, the naked flesh, the howling and 
                                                 
9
 It seems most likely Conrad has the wrathful, in Canto VII of Inferno, in mind. “Questi si percotean non 
pur con mano, / ma con la testa e col petto e coi piedi, / troncandosi co’ denti a brano a brano.” (“They 
were smiting each other not only with the hand but with head and breast and feet and tearing each other 
piecemeal with their teeth.”) The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: Inferno, Italian text with translation 
and summary by John D. Sinclair (London: Oxford University Press), 104, 105. 
10
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 84. 
11
 Ibid., 85. 
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guttural cries, the helplessness before the forces of nature, the mixture of inertia and 
struggling, dullness and brutality – reinforces the impression that these people are, or are 
like, animals. As such, they represent a different and in every sense lower order of nature 
from the men who man the ship. 
 
And here we may feel we are on familiar ground, with the projection of 
asymmetrical alterity inscribed right through Western discourse about the Orient and 
Africa in the age of empire, and exhaustively documented. The conception of the savage, 
brutal and prehistoric, discloses – or perhaps precipitates, since it is not really possible to 
say which comes first, and each depends on the other – the self-conception of the 
civilized, humane and advanced, just as the concept of the barbarian helped Aristotle to 
define the self-conception of the Greeks. And just so, here in “Typhoon” we have the 
European crew, at least the officers, unremarkable men in themselves, but the 
representatives of a civilization with ideas and institutions, a law and order, which enable 
them to maintain a civil state throughout the crisis of the storm, and to impose it on the 
lawless and brutal creatures beneath them. The coolies are pacified, and under the 
authority of the captain the dollars are distributed in a way acceptable to all. So this is one 
way of solving the category problem of the Chinese coolies. They cannot be described as 
passengers because passengers are human beings, but they are not cargo either because 
cargo is non-human. They can best be described as pre-human – prehistoric human 
animals, in the state of nature, but a long way from developing the institutions, covenants 
and amenities that characterize civilization or, as Hobbes calls it, the civil state. These 
things will have to be supplied for them and imposed on them. 
 
If we are looking, then, for the history of Chinese people in Conrad’s “Typhoon”, 
it looks as if we must be obliged to say that the Chinese have no history, other than the 
history entered into at the very end of the story, when the coolies voluntarily (not under 
coercion) accept the captain’s redistribution of their assets, thus contracting to relinquish 
some of their rights for the sake of peace, and entering the civil state according to the 
proper Hobbesian model.12 A contrast between Western people who live in history, and 
Asian and African people who live in nature, is one of the master tropes of Orientalist 
discourse. Although Conrad for his part had little enough belief in the mission 
civilisatrice, he was not above representing Africans, for example, as living a simple and 
barely self-conscious life outside the stream of history that bore Europeans on, for good 
or ill. Such people – often appearing in Western representation as childish or infantile – 
could be thought of as not yet emerged, and perhaps never to emerge, into the light of 
historical day.13  And yet of course it would take an invincible ignorance to see the 
Chinese people in this way. The antiquity of Chinese civilization was undeniable. The 
boatswain’s vision of anarchy in the hold could not be the whole story. 
 
Second compartment: an epitome of the history of the Chinese 
 
                                                 
12
 In the state of nature, Hobbes had argued, “every man has a right to every thing”. Ibid., 87. 
13
 The genealogy of this idea includes Hegel’s observations about the Dark Continent in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History. 
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If we turn the clock back to the time before the typhoon strikes, and watch them 
as they take their leisure on deck in calm weather, we do indeed see a rather different 
picture of the Chinese as human aggregate. 
The fore-deck, packed with Chinamen, was full of sombre clothing, yellow faces, 
and pigtails, sprinkled over with a good many naked shoulders, for there was no 
wind, and the heat was close. The coolies lounged, talked, smoked, or stared over 
the rail; some, drawing water over the side, sluiced each other; a few slept on 
hatches, while several small parties of six sat on their heels surrounding iron trays 
with plates of rice and tiny teacups; and every single Celestial of them was 
carrying with him all he had in the world – a wooden chest with a ringing lock 
and brass on the corners, containing the savings of his labours: some clothes of 
ceremony, sticks of incense, a little opium maybe, bits of nameless rubbish of 
conventional value, and a small hoard of silver dollars, toiled for in coal lighters, 
won in gambling-houses or in petty trading, grubbed out of earth, sweated out in 
mines, on railway lines, in deadly jungle, under heavy burdens – amassed 
patiently, guarded with care, cherished fiercely (6-7). 
There are not many images in Conrad of a proper human community that is not actually 
engaged on a common task of work: this is one, for here for once we see the labourers 
released from labour. The description assembles some of the usual images of Chinese life 
(rice, tea, smoking, pigtails) but the associations of the language here speak of sociality, 
co-operation, nourishment, simplicity and peace, while the stillness of the weather and 
the monotony of the voyage lend it an idyllic timelessness. There is a culture here, a 
group life, and the coolies only become singular (“every single Celestial”) as holders of 
private property; but the dollars are not only their living but also their life, containing 
their history and their labour. These men’s proven capacity for hard work earns Conrad’s 
approbation, and their amenability to the arrangements will recommend them to Mr 
Jukes, who has charge of accommodating them – so much so, that when the ship begins 
to roll in heavy swell as the storm approaches, Jukes will draw the captain’s attention to 
their discomfort. So far, so civil. The coolies show no natural propensity for savagery, 
and their anarchic violence is not aboriginal, but still in the future. However, in the 
second group portrait of them on deck, as the heat rises and the barometer falls, we may 
detect some small ominous signs of change. 
The sun, pale and without rays, poured down leaden heat in a strangely indecisive 
light, and the Chinamen were lying prostrate about the decks. Captain MacWhirr 
noticed two of them especially, stretched out on their backs below the bridge. As 
soon as they had closed their eyes they seemed dead. Three others, however, were 
quarrelling barbarously away forward; and one big fellow, half naked, with 
herculean shoulders, was hanging limply on a winch; another, sitting on the deck, 
his knees up and his head drooping sideways in a girlish attitude, was plaiting his 
pigtail with infinite languor depicted in his whole person and in the very 
movement of his fingers (20-21). 
 
Not every reader would be reminded by this passage of Napoleon’s legendary 
remark about China being a sleeping giant, but it was certainly a commonplace among 
nineteenth-century stereotypes. It does seem that a strong enchantment, perhaps 
associated with that “strangely indecisive light”, has enthralled the coolies on the deck of 
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the Nan-Shan. They are significantly less active than when we first saw them, even those 
who have not dropped into a death-counterfeiting sleep.14 Inanition grips them, and it 
seems they are only aroused to quarrel among themselves. There is, in fact, a giant in 
sight, and although not asleep he is drained of virility, and hangs limply on the winch, an 
emasculated Hercules or shorn Samson. The other individual selected for attention has 
entirely relinquished his hold on manhood, his girlish attitude belonging more properly to 
the boudoir than to the deck of a steamship.  
 
The concepts, icons and symbols of non-Western masculinities have probably 
always presented something of a challenge to European paradigms of gender.15 Here we 
can quite readily place these images of compromised manhood within a familiar binary 
typology in which Western masculinity, or potency, triumphs over Eastern femininity, or 
impotence.16  Often this perceived failure of the Orient to measure up has to be 
historicized if it is to look plausible, as it is in the case of the common British narrative of 
Indian (particularly Bengali) effeminacy as the consequence of the decay of Hindu 
culture. Once again, the undeniable magnificence of China’s past makes a similar 
historicization necessary in its case. Consequently the feminization of China is perceived 
as something that has happened to the nation – it is not the opposite of masculinity, but 
its loss. It is not particularly surprising that the trouble afflicting the Chinese as disaster 
looms over them should be envisaged, in this Western modality, as a crisis in sexuality 
and gender.17 
 
We now have three tableaux or epitomes of the Chinese aggregate: three tableaux 
in chronological order can make a narrative. First, the image of a peaceful and even 
utopian culture, with individuals going about their business in co-operation and tolerance. 
Second, the image of that culture with the beginnings of internal conflict, evidence of 
enervation and narcissism, and a crisis of manliness. And finally, the human aggregate 
reduced to its natural or animal state, a single seething mass in which individuals are not 
to be distinguished, but everyone fights everyone else for resources. We might 
characterize this third image as one of incoherent homogeneity. 
 
The phrase is taken from Herbert Spencer, who defined evolution as “a change 
from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity”.18 It is Spencer who can 
supply the key to this layer of the Chinese box. With his application of the idea of 
evolution to the human sciences, Spencer elaborated one of the nineteenth century’s two 
                                                 
14
 In Lord Jim, the deathly sleep of passengers on deck had presaged a disaster to come. 
15
 See Kam Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), and Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and 
Japan, ed. Kam Louie and Morris Low (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). 
16
 Of relevance here is the fact that the coolies appear to have no leader. The extremely diffident agent of 
the Bun Hin company has merged into the aggregate and become indistinguishable. 
17
 The construction of gender in “Typhoon”, especially in relation to the coolies, is interestingly discussed 
in the following studies: Geoffrey Galt Harpham, One of Us: The Mastery of Joseph Conrad (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 133-35; Andrew Michael Roberts, Conrad and Masculinity (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), 74-82; Ross G. Forman, op. cit. 
18
 “Evolution Defined”, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution: Selected Writings, ed. J. D. Y. Peel 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972), 71. 
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most influential models of history.19 Spencer’s notion of social evolution is sometimes 
unfairly associated with a triumphalist optimism about the inevitability of progress. 
Certainly it was enlisted by his late nineteenth-century contemporaries as what was 
believed to be a scientific justification for the high-handed actions of those who thought 
of themselves as evolution’s darlings. Later in his life (he died a year after the publication 
of “Typhoon”), Spencer was, as we shall see, by no means complacent about the 
directions his own society and nation seemed to be taking.20 Indeed his teleology had 
never been as crude as some of his more bouncing statements might have suggested. 
“Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-
divergent.”21 In certain conditions, indeed, the current of progress could be reversed, in 
an evolutionary apostasy in which a group could revert to the qualities and behaviour of 
their predatory past. A wholesale regression of this kind was what Spencer called re-
barbarization. “The cruelty of primitives was an essential to evolution,” after all, and 
everyone had seen instances in which predatory habits could resurface in civilized 
people; moreover, “to make the evidence more complete, we have the fact that men, 
partially adapted to the social state, retrograde upon being placed in circumstances which 
call forth the old propensities.”22 
 
What I am reading as the epitome of the history of the Chinese in “Typhoon” 
conforms quite exactly to the Spencerian model of retrogression – in other words, the 
model which was used as an explanation and sometimes justification for European global 
success at the end of the nineteenth century could also explain and perhaps justify the 
dire straits in which Chinese people found themselves. The greatness of the Chinese past 
– in particular the apparently timeless tranquility and continuity of classical Chinese 
civilization – need not be questioned; this was given. But in modern times the view from 
the West was that this equilibrium had been lost, unsettled by the helpless decadence of 
the Manchu, and a new era of something like savagery ushered in by the wholesale self-
destruction of the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), and confirmed, it seemed, by the lunacy 
of the recent Boxer uprising (1899-1900).23 
 
Third compartment: re-barbarization 
 
                                                 
19
 The other great narrative, Marxist history, is equally indebted to evolutionary ideas and assumptions. 
20
 He had already by 1851 abandoned the idea of a determined, unimpeded upward growth. “Spencer’s 
political thought reflects the developmental antithesis which he perceived between the first and second 
halves of the nineteenth century, the first a golden age of peace, prosperity and individual freedom, the 
second a period of regression, war, chauvinism, state interference, and bureaucratic tyranny.” David 
Wiltshire, The Social and Political Thought of Herbert Spencer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
101. See also Brian W. Shaffer, The Blinding Torch: Modern British Fiction and the Discourse of 
Civilization (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 1-44. Shaffer also has a chapter (45-61) 
on Conrad’s African fiction and Spencerian sociology, which has been useful for my argument here.  
21
 “The Factors of Social Evolution”, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, 133. 
22
 “Social Statics and Dynamics”, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, 19, 20. 
23
 For the Taiping, see Yu-wen Jen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1973), and Jonathan D. Spence, God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong 
Xiuquan (New York: Norton, 1996). For the Boxers, see Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers 
as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). Further sources are given 
in the Fourth Compartment below. 
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Before considering the specifics of these events in Chinese history, let me make 
the case for seeing what happens to the Chinese coolies on the Nan-Shan as a form of 
retrogression culminating in what Spencer called re-barbarization. To do this, it is 
necessary to tell Spencer’s story of progress at first forwards, then backwards. Organic 
evolution moves from simple incoherence to complex organization, Spencer explains; 
from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from uniformity to differentiation and 
specialization. Social evolution also follows this pattern. With the emergence of social 
structure, co-operation is enabled by hierarchy and the specialization of tasks, and there 
are associated developments of language, knowledge, morals, aesthetics. “Progress in 
intelligence, thus associated with progress in language, has also to be treated as an 
accompaniment of social progress; which, while furthering it, is furthered by it.”24 
Conflict and competition are and remain the rule. The state of nature is one of perpetual 
and incoherent conflict between everyone and everyone. With social organization, 
according to the Spencerian paradigm, conflict is institutionalized, and this produces a 
militaristic society. But if progress is unimpeded, militarism is succeeded by industrial 
society, and the crude physical competition of war gives way to a more enlightened era of 
non-aggressive economic competition. The highest expression of this phase, for Spencer, 
was a completely free trade. “The stages through which the industrial part [of society] 
passes, from its original union with the governmental part to its ultimate separateness, 
have to be studied.”25 
 
The coolies on the Nan-Shan pretty comprehensively reverse this process. Though 
we never see them at work, our first sight of them disclosed the history and fruits of their 
industry, in the shape of the earned private property of each, and the wages they are 
bringing home to share with their families. The simple contents of their wooden chests 
also gave evidence of a civilization and individuality, ritual objects indicating a spiritual 
life, medicine (“a little opium”) to alleviate the pains of the body,26 and the small 
personal possessions that speak of a private life. Their actions are co-operative – sluicing 
each other with water, sharing food – and outwardly directed. This seems to be changing 
in the second tableau, where there is no group life at all: the only sign of interaction is of 
three men “quarrelling barbarously” (21); the rest seem to have retreated into their own 
quasi-narcoleptic sphere, to sleep or brood or preen. They participate, if at all, in a highly 
belated phase of culture, in which “[a]ll the Chinamen on deck appeared at their last 
gasp” (25). But the really dramatic regression comes in the third tableau, with the 
struggle in the dark depths of the ship. 
 
The nineteenth-century evolutionists concurred with Hobbes in thinking of the 
state of nature as chaotic and cruel, the naked form of what Thomas Henry Huxley called 
                                                 
24
 “The Factors in Social Evolution”, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, 131. 
25
 Ibid., 130. 
26
 Recent research has suggested that most opium smokers in China used it in moderate quantities and with 
few harmful effects. Among the poor it was prized as a medical panacea as well as a refreshing tonic for 
hard-working men and women, a hunger-repressant and a painkiller. Frank Dikötter, Lars Laamann and 
Zhou Xun, Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2004), 46-92. 
 9
“the struggle for existence, the competition of each with all”.27 This is certainly what is 
witnessed first by the boatswain and then by Jukes in the fore ’tween-deck, where the 
struggling mass of coolies is not engaged in anything as organized as warfare, but in a 
violent and random free-for-all. The individuals who constitute this heap of bodies are 
indistinguishable. Not only are they not differentiated or named, they are so entangled as 
to be, to all appearance, disarticulated, a heaving pile of body-parts. The very inability of 
the Chinese to be distinguished one from another already suggests they are a low form of 
life in Spencerian terms, for Spencer had understood that development works and is 
measured by differentiation. History can only get going when one member of the 
aggregate is capable of differing from another in function, and so the lumpen coolies are 
strictly speaking a prehistoric formation.  
 
The noises they make – howls and shrieks (56), a great howl, guttural cries, a long 
moan (58), a fierce mutter, gusts of screams dying away (77) – hardly amount to human 
language, a faculty whose instrumental part in progress Spencer had discussed. When 
later one of them does speak, apparently to complain, what Jukes hears is 
“incomprehensible guttural hooting sounds, that did not seem to belong to a human 
language”, and which fill him with a strange emotion, “as if a brute had tried to be 
eloquent” (80). No language, no hierarchy, no structure. “The hatchway ladder was 
loaded with coolies swarming on it like bees on a branch” (62), but the coolies have none 
of the functional organization of bees, taken as a model of a well-ordered society since 
the time of Virgil.28 Although not individuated, the Chinese in the hold are completely 
(one might say biologically) selfish, and this too could be taken to be characteristically 
primitive. “Conversely,” said Spencer, “among ourselves a desire to diminish human 
misery is accompanied by a desire to ameliorate the condition of inferior creatures,”29 and 
the tale will go on to show these worthy desires animating Captain MacWhirr, even at the 
height of his personal danger and that of his crew.  
 
Aggression prompted by selfishness can only be restrained by a commensurate 
power of sympathy, Spencer believed. But “perpetual warlike activities repress 
sympathy”, and cultivate aggressiveness.30 The coolies in the hold show no awareness of 
the pain they are inflicting on each other, and Spencer would probably maintain that the 
longer they fight, the more callous they will become, in a descending spiral of savagery. 
Meanwhile even the scramble for dollars, the original cause of the mayhem, is forgotten, 
as the drama in the dark loses even its economic character and becomes the state of 
nature itself, a simple struggle for survival. 
The struggle, however it began, had turned into a scramble of blind panic. If the 
coolies had started up after their scattered dollars they were by that time fighting 
only for their footing. They took each other by the throat merely to save 
themselves from being hurled about. Whoever got a hold anywhere would kick at 
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the others who caught at his legs and hung on, till a roll sent them flying together 
across the deck (78). 
Not surprisingly, Jukes and the other members of the crew fear that this desperate 
aggressiveness will be turned on them. 
 
Fourth compartment: the narrative of Chinese decay – the Taiping and the Boxers  
 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the hapless Qing dynasty was 
increasingly beleaguered. The Chinese empire was economically weak, corrupt, locally 
lawless, and beset by aggressive foreign powers. Between 1850 and 1873, the population 
of China dropped drastically, in no small measure due to a reported loss of fifteen or 
twenty million lives as a result of the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864.31 It has been 
maintained that Chinese warfare was unusually lawless and devastating. “Because of a 
lack of established codes of conduct governing warfare,” Kang Chao explains, “Chinese 
wars and conflicts were extraordinarily destructive.”32 Very little attention was paid in 
Europe to this cataclysmic event on the other side of the globe. For the English public, 
China in the mid-nineteenth century and later was chiefly the site of satisfactorily short 
naval and military campaigns (the “Opium Wars” of 1839–42 and 1856–60) and of 
missionary activity. The Taiping was known of, if at all, because of the presence of 
foreign commanders, Frederick Townsend Ward and later Charles George Gordon 
(“Chinese Gordon”), in the government forces that eventually destroyed the “Heavenly 
Kingdom” of the Taiping.33 
 
China’s image in the West in the nineteenth century was generally more negative 
than it had been a century before.34 It was seen, with some justice, as a nation in decline, 
especially as measured against the vigorous expansionist European powers, busily 
carving out their spheres of interest and extraterritorial possessions on Chinese soil. The 
glories of China’s culture were known, but as far as most Western observers were 
concerned they belonged to the past. Contemporary China was generally thought to be 
characterized by cultural stagnation, military ineptitude, “superstition” (a resistance to 
Christianity), economic collapse and social decay, with an inward-looking, secretive and 
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extremely conservative government and court.35 If the Taiping had been the most epical 
factor in this decline, the Boxer rebellion at the turn of the century was the event that 
brought it most directly to the attention of the Western press, and hence public.  
 
The Boxer society, the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists”, was formed in 1898, 
and the first Boxer attacks on outposts and symbols of Western influence came at the 
very beginning of 1900. The rebellion grew, and was being extensively reported in the 
European and American press through 1900, the climax of the story being the raising of 
the siege of the foreign legations in Peking in August. Punitive expeditions continued at 
least until April 1901, and negotiations with the Qing government culminated in the 
signing of the Boxer protocol, in September. Conrad’s first reference to the story that 
became “Typhoon” is in a letter in February 1899. It is mentioned again, and delayed, in 
January 1900. A specimen was sent to William Blackwood in October, its author then 
anticipating a story of some twelve thousand words. Running eventually to twenty-eight 
thousand words, the tale was completed in January 1901.36 The gestation and 
composition of “Typhoon” coincide with the Boxer rebellion and its aftermath. 
 
Though no doubt almost the last straw in the burden that was to crush the Qing a 
decade later, the Boxer rebellion was a small-scale affair compared to the devastation of 
the Taiping half a century earlier. But it was much more extensively reported in the West, 
partly because more foreigners were the Boxers’ primary target, and partly too because 
by 1900 Europe was in direct telegraphic contact with China (though not with Peking 
during the siege of the legations). The first mention of the Boxers in the foreign press was 
in the English-language North China Daily News in October 1899. The first missionary 
was killed on the last day of the year. The Boxers’ anger was directed at foreigners and 
their Chinese associates and surrogates (mostly Chinese Christians), and though many 
more Chinese than non-Chinese were killed in the Boxer turmoil, it was largely presented 
to the Western public as a conflict in which Westerners were the principal victims. This 
reaction is incidentally reproduced in the anxiety of Jukes that the swarming Chinese in 
the Nan-Shan’s hold will soon turn their aggression on the crew. Such was the reputation 
for cruelty of the Boxers that in Arthur Conan Doyle’s story “The Pot of Caviare”, an 
experienced old professor judges it better to murder the entire European population of a 
besieged outpost, rather than allow them to fall into the hands of their unspeakable Boxer 
attackers.37  
 
A study by Jane E. Elliott argues that the most sensationalist coverage of the 
rebellion was not in mass-circulation newspapers like the Daily Mail or the New York 
World, but in the London Times. 
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Examination of both The Times editorial column and the columns written by 
special correspondents reveals a highly-coloured and emotive attitude to the 
Boxers, Chinese statesmen, Chinese military leaders and the Empress Dowager 
herself. There was a persistent use of adjectives such as “cruel”, “ferocious”, 
“revolting”, “decayed”, “reactionary”, “murderous”, “rigidly conservative”, 
“malign”, “ignorant”, “reckless”, “criminally apathetic”, “corrupt”, “treacherous”, 
“arrogant”, “sinister”, “audacious”, and “notorious”.38 
The uprising was seen as an anti-foreign movement instigated and directed by the 
Empress Dowager; the complex relation between the rebellion and various individuals 
and factions within the government and imperial court was not something the Times 
leaders were up to disentangling. The predicament of the foreigners themselves seemed 
easy enough to understand – martyred missionaries, beleaguered diplomats, heroic 
garrison and relief column. But the Chinese side of things was so intractable a knot – just 
whose side, for example, was the Chinese Imperial Army on? – that for most readers of 
the Times the overall impression must have been one of simple chaos.  
 
If the events in North China were presented as impenetrably obscure, it is possible 
that some of the confusion attributed to the Chinese situation was displaced from the 
helpless inability of the foreign observers and victims of the uprising to make any sense 
of its highly complex and shifting circumstances. Who were the Boxers and how were 
they different from any of the many secret societies of whose existence the foreigners had 
some inkling? Who were their leaders and what did they want? What was their relation to 
the Chinese state and the national army?  Incidents and rumours, confusing in 
themselves, were often reported in emotive language and relayed in a fast but extremely 
imperfect modern communication system. The outlandishly irrational nature of the 
Boxers themselves, with their mass spirit possession and their belief in their 
invulnerability, can only have compounded the feeling that the Chinese were doing 
something beyond comprehension, that made no sense, an assault not only on Christianity 
but on civilization itself.  
 
This indeed remains the tenor of the “Boxer myth”, as Paul A. Cohen concludes 
in his study of the event and its representations. 
In the years immediately following the uprising, the Boxers were a prime focus of 
Yellow Peril demonology. Throughout the century they have been understood 
single-dimensionally as an emblem of barbarism, cruelty, irrational hatred of 
foreigners, and superstition. This pattern made its first appearance while the 
uprising was still in progress.39 
But Cohen also points out that the denigration of the Boxers as specifically barbaric and 
primitive was largely shared by the modernizing Chinese intellectuals of the late Qing. 
He mentions the famous 1903 pamphlet The Revolutionary Army (Gemingjun) by Zou 
Rong, which makes a distinction between civilized revolutions (wenming zhi geming) – 
desiderated for modern China – and barbaric revolutions (yeman zhi geming) such as the 
Boxer uprising. “The Boxers, for Zou, were a symbol of everything in Chinese society he 
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wanted destroyed.”40 Specifically, they were a regressive formation, a throwback to a 
barbaric past. It is worth invoking the development, in the reformers’ narrative of 
Chinese modernity, of the ideas of English evolutionists, Darwin, Huxley, and Herbert 
Spencer.41 Spencer’s model of history was not simply “Western”. 
 
The history of the nation was understood to have reached a critical point. Could 
China evolve as a modern nation, or was it condemned to backwardness and anarchy, 
nasty and brutish? For the reformists, the Boxers were an embarrassment, only 
highlighting the need for a real progressive revolution that would free China from the 
foreigners and put it on the path to modernity. For most foreigners – and we must number 
Captain MacWhirr of the Nan-Shan among them – the example of what seemed barbaric 
and chaotic behaviour on the part of the Chinese only further proved the need, even the 
duty, of foreigners to intervene and sort them out. MacWhirr first orders the ’tween-deck 
hold to be opened up for the violent pacification of the coolies, and after the storm he 
reforms the economic chaos of the broken Chinese boxes by a fiscal intervention, 
arranging for the dollars to be divided equally among all the coolies, the remaining 
fraction to go to those most seriously hurt in the storm. His action is of dubious legality 
(there is a question of jurisdiction), but he justifies it – and according to Jukes the coolies 
accept it – on the grounds that the institutions of the Chinese state are hopelessly 
dysfunctional. “As to giving up the money to any Chinese official he could scare up in 
Fu-chau, he said he might just as well put the lot in his own pocket at once for all the 
good it would be to them” (101-2).42 
 
In summary, then, within the story of the coolies on the Nan-Shan in “Typhoon” 
is another narrative which can be read as a history of the Chinese as a whole. In this 
history, the peaceful equilibrium of the nation’s earlier civilization has become a 
retrogression, characterized by a loss of the harmonious interaction of elements of the 
social organism, of energy and differentiation of function, until under environmental 
pressure this decline has turned catastrophic and become a wholesale re-barbarization, a 
seething state of anarchy akin to the pre-civilized state of nature. In the ensuing chaos, 
the now indistinguishable and virtually dehumanized participants present a threat to 
foreigners as well as to each other. This narrative about Chinese people, written in the 
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aftermath of the Boxer rebellion, and apparently underwritten by it, seems to confirm or 
naturalize the authority of Europeans over Chinese, and the need of the latter for the 
former. 
 
It is, it seems, environmental pressure – the typhoon itself – that causes a collapse 
of the civil state among the Chinese on board, and their reversion to barbaric behaviour. 
But it has no such effect on the European crew of the Nan-Shan. Whatever may be 
thought of Captain MacWhirr’s bone-headed decision not to change course in the first 
place, the white crew perform creditably in the extreme test of the typhoon. Unlike the 
undifferentiated coolies, each crew member has a specialized function and most have a 
name. They are individuals, but they work together and – with the exception of the 
second mate, who loses his nerve, is struck by the captain, and will be dismissed – they 
obey orders, with a due measure of unheroic grumbling. The engines themselves 
symbolize the workings of Spencer’s industrial society and are endowed, however 
ironically, with moral qualities and a heroic work ethic. “There was the prudent sagacity 
of wisdom and the deliberation of enormous strength in their movements. This was their 
work – this patient coaxing of a distracted ship over the fury of the waves and into the 
very eye of the wind” (73). The chief engineer is professionally scornful of the “deck 
people”, who are dilettantish and get in the way – “You fellows are going wrong for want 
of something to do….” (75) – but the ship is a law-governed society that works on the 
joint principles of specialization and co-operation, enjoined by a contract of employment, 
as he reminds them: “Remember the articles: Sailors and firemen to assist each other” 
(76).43 The crew seems a highly evolved and exemplary human aggregate, and its social 
qualities secure it evolution’s great and only prize, survival in the face of nature. 
 
Fifth compartment: another story – the coolies and the flag 
 
For it is not, in the end, simply the hostility of the elements that brutalizes the 
coolies. To understand what has brought them to that dehumanizing scramble in the hold, 
we need to consider the human environment, and the story gives us enough clues to 
elucidate it. I will now argue that the last and appropriately deconstructive compartment 
is not inside the others, but outside – indeed, all around. It is the economic environment 
of the voyage of the Nan-Shan, the coolie trade itself, and the part played by coolie traffic 
in generating wealth through Britain’s extracolonial engagement with the non-European 
world. I will discuss the trade here as it bears on Conrad’s treatment in “Typhoon” of this 
phase in the history of the Chinese. 
 
The indentured labour trade sprang up in the 1830s to replace freed slaves on the 
sugar plantations in British colonies, but soon expanded into a truly globalized traffic. 
Worsening conditions in nineteenth-century China drove many to make use of China’s 
superior internal transport to reach coastal ports and seek work abroad, making available 
a supply of good-quality labour. “The comparison of other races with the Chinese when 
questions of labour arose was in fact very popular with the Victorians, who were agreed 
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that the key characteristic of that race was diligence.”44 From the 1840s, Chinese agents 
had begun to hire superior European vessels. Before long Chinese labourers were 
working in the Straits Settlements, Australia, Peru, British Guiana, Hawaii, the Caribbean 
and the Transvaal. Many had married just before leaving China, and hoped to return 
loaded with riches.45  
 
Under Qing law it was treason to leave China, and punishable by death, so the 
traffic was illicit and there were many scandals involving kidnapping and deception. As 
ever with economic migrancy, questions of agency are not straightforward. “The line 
between voluntary and involuntary,” says David Northrup, “is further blurred by the fact 
that the migrants’ desperation and ignorance made them easy to cheat and deceive.”46 
The Peking conventions with Britain and France in 1860 forced the Chinese government 
to recognize its subjects’ right to make contracts and to leave China. But though the 
traffic was now no longer illegal it was still subject to abuses, and the conditions of 
transportation (never mind the conditions of work) remained notorious, as Robert L. Irick 
notes. 
Almost every work dealing with the coolie trade cites numerous instances of ships 
being scuttled, taken over, burned, or sunk by the terrified passengers. There were 
several cases in which the crew battened down the hatches and abandoned the 
ships, leaving the coolies to suffocate, burn to death, or drown. News of the 
successes of coolie mutinies was so widespread that organized attempts were 
subsequently made by Chinese pirates disguised as coolies to take over several of 
the ships engaged in the trade.47 
 
It is thus not hard to understand both the anxiety of Jukes and others of the 
European crew, who rush to arm themselves when the captain releases the two hundred 
Chinese from the hold (100), and the earlier terror of the Chinese themselves, who 
assume Jukes and the other white devils have entered the hold with the intention of 
slaughtering them (78-9). If the coolies are demonized in the eyes of the crew, they might 
justly reply, with Frankenstein’s creature, “Misery made me a fiend”. 
 
Indentured labourers were not slaves, and indeed the traffic in them was instituted 
as a more humane alternative to the slave trade. But it is fair to say they were the closest 
thing to slaves in a non-slave economy, and their lives as coolies, even when entered into 
voluntarily, were not rich in human dignity. Some attempt was made to secure their 
interest and safety (they were, if nothing else, valuable only if delivered safely, at least on 
outward journeys). David Northrup says that overall, ships carrying indentured migrants 
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had a good safety record.48 Furthermore, on British vessels certain standards were 
mandated for the accommodation of passengers. “In 1840 ships from British possessions 
whose routes crossed the equator had to provide fifteen square feet of space per passenger 
with decks no lower than 5.5 feet and containing no more than two tiers of berths. These 
rules applied to vessels carrying indentured Indians and Africans as well as Chinese 
shipped from Hong Kong.”49 But these regulations do not apply to the Nan-Shan. 
 
For though the ship was built in Dumbarton and is crewed by British and Irish 
sailors, and comes out East on a British register, its European owners, Messrs. Sigg and 
Son, have “judged it expedient to transfer her to the Siamese flag” (9).50 The reflagging 
of ships for commercial reasons can be traced back to the need of seventeenth-century 
English merchant ships to avoid Spanish monopoly restrictions on trade with the West 
Indies; however, the widespread use of flags of convenience is a twentieth-century 
phenomenon.51 Since the motive in this case cannot be anonymity of ownership, or lower 
crewing costs, it can only be the avoidance of regulatory control and of scrutiny of 
conditions on board to British merchant marine standards. In other words, the expediency 
that counts for Messrs. Sigg and Son bears directly on the treatment of the coolies who 
will be the Nan-Shan’s principal cargo. The change of flag ensures that the ship’s human 
trafficking will not be complicated by any over-fastidious liberal-humanitarian scruples. 
This is the convenience that the Siamese flag of convenience confers. 
 
Similar motives seem to have been in play in the choice of a none too imaginative 
captain. MacWhirr recommends himself to the owners’ agent when he is given a tour of 
inspection of the new ship “ready to take up the work of her life” (7), by asking no 
questions at all about it; his only query is about a faulty lock (thus perhaps signalling the 
carceral instincts that will lead him to lock in the coolies in the storm). Old Mr Sigg, the 
senior partner, warms to a captain who “you could be sure would not try to improve upon 
his instructions” (9). MacWhirr can be relied on only to obey orders, and his decision not 
to alter course confirms this sterling quality. He dismisses Jukes’s suggestion: “You want 
me to haul a full-powered steamship four points off her course to make the Chinamen 
comfortable!” (31). He is not to be distracted by humanitarian concerns, and cannot 
imagine the human consequences of his decision – or what it might be like to be 
imprisoned below deck for hours in darkness, fighting for your life with two hundred 
others in a typhoon, because the ship’s captain has not been willing to change course and 
run up an extra coal bill for his owners. Conrad’s tale recognizes, as Spencer did not, that 
re-barbarization may be transitive, and dehumanized behaviour the result of 
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dehumanizing treatment. Marx had given a name, alienation, to the deformation of the 
human by the exploitation and greed of others, and this effect of the coolie trade is 
another part or compartment of the history of the Chinese in “Typhoon”.  
 
There are poignant moments in the story when MacWhirr, and Jukes too, show 
signs of recognizing the full humanity of the Chinese – and moments too perhaps of a 
similar glimpse in the passengers’ view of the crew. But these are brief and bewildering 
flickers of light in the dark farce of the story, and no one has the time, or the imagination, 
or the dialogic facility, to sustain them.52 These people’s shared ordeal in the end does 
nothing to create any lasting bond across the cultural gulfs that divide them. Most of the 
time MacWhirr and the crew consider and treat the Chinese in specie, as inanimate 
economic units. “They had had a doing that would have shaken the soul out of a white 
man,” Jukes acknowledges. “But then they say a Chinaman has no soul” (101). The 
confirmation of this notion that the Chinese have nothing inside comes in the last image 
of the story, when Jukes in his letter has reported the “equitable division” with which 
MacWhirr redistributes the scattered dollars.53 
We turned-to afterwards, and shovelled out on deck heaps of wet rags, all sorts of 
fragments of things without shape, and that you couldn’t give a name to, and let 
them settle the ownership themselves (102). 
Once the coolies’ dollars have been accounted for, Jukes cannot assign or name the other 
things that belong to them. He cannot even identify them as things in the first place. But 
the narrative has seen, named and inventoried these things before. They are the remaining 
contents of the Chinese boxes. 
 
“Typhoon” was serialized in Pall Mall Magazine in the early months of 1902, the 
year before Herbert Spencer died. The great sociologist might well have seen in the 
turmoil of recent Chinese history a drift away from the civil state to more primitive forms 
of behaviour, but in his last years he was more exercised by ominous signs of what he 
called “the re-barbarization accompanying the movement towards Imperialism” at home, 
and the same year, 1902, saw the publication in Facts and Comments of his essay “Re-
barbarization”.54 A century on, his list of regressive formations makes interesting reading 
– he points to imperial ambition, electoral oligarchies, a bellicose press, the militarization 
of religion and educational institutions, increased professionalization and brutality in 
sport, a cult of violence and success in popular literature, journalism and art.55 It is 
unlikely that the author of the recent “Heart of Darkness” would have dissented much 
from the view that history, even for Europe, might be taking the form of what Wilfred 
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Owen in 1918 would call the “trek from progress”.56 And behind barbarism, late 
Victorian evolutionists warned, lay the state of nature, never fully transcended, a spectre 
haunting modernity no less than the primitive. The human race, T. H. Huxley wrote, was 
ineluctably committed to “the struggle for existence with the state of nature outside it, 
and the tendency to the return to the struggle within”.57 The Nan-Shan with its 
complement of travellers, human beings of different provenances, contending with the 
elemental violence of the storm, and the commensurate violence in the fore ’tween-deck, 
seems a fitting symbol of that struggle without and within.  
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